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in Stalker v. jlfcDonald, 6
Hill 93; which has been followed in
many other states. See Roxborough v.
Messick, 6 Ohio St. 448, a very valuable
case on the subject. Bertrand v. Barkman, 13 Ark. 150; Jenkins v. Schaub,
14 Wis. I ; Prentice v. Zane, 2 Graft.
(Va.) 262; Grant v. Kidwell, 30 Mo.
455; Fenouville v. Hamilton, 35 Ala.
319 ; Brooks v. lVhitson, 7 Sin. & Mar.
513; Kimbro v. Lytle, 10 Yerg. 417,
428 ; Petriev. Clark, 11 S. & I. 377 ;
Kirkpatrick v. Muirhead, 16 Penn. St.
117.
The difference between the cases may
be attributed in part to the different effect
given by different courts to the mere fact
of.accepting a collateral security of a
third person's note payable on some
future day. Those which infer or imply
an agreement to extend the time of payWALWORTH

RECENT

ment to such future day as in Atkinson
v. Brooks, supra, easily find a consideration for such transfer, while those who
deny this, require proof of some actual
agreement to this effect, or some other
similar consideration.
The learned editors of the American
Leading Cases, in their note to Swift v.
Tyson, vol. 1. p. 422 (5th ed.), say,
"the weight of opinion is that if the instrumeut is given merely as collateral
security for an existing debt, the right
of action on the original debt being plainly
and in allrespectsunaltered,it is not given
for a valuable consideration, and is not
See also the
discharged of equities."
excellent note in Bigelow's cases on Bills
and Notes, p. 498, &c.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.
Bpston.

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Texas.
TEXAS, &c., RAILROAD CO. v. CAPPS.
"Baggage" includes only such articles of personal convenience or necessity as
are usually carried by passengers for their personal use, and does not include
samples carried for purposes of sale.
Permission given by a railroad agent to a passenger to leave his trunk containing
such samples for a few days at the station to which it had been checked, the agent
having no knowledge of the fact that the trunk contained such samples, does not
render the company liable for the trunk and its contents as baggage.
Where, in such case, the station was burned and the trunk destroyed, the passenger cannot recover without proving negligence on the part of the company.
Semble, Where a railroad company, through its baggage or ticket agent, receives
articles for transportation as baggage, knowing at the time that such articles are not
properly baggage, the company will be responsible therefor as a common carrier,
and will be estopped from denying that the same was baggage.

APPEAL from County Court.
Appellee instituted this suit in a justice's court to recover of
appellant $104.50, the alleged value of a trunk and its contents,
shipped by him' as baggage over appellant's road from Big Sandy
to Longview, and destroyed in a fire which burned up appellant's
depot at the latter place.
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Appellee recovered judgment for the full amount of his claim,
and for costs, in the justice's court. On appeal by appellant to the
county court, and upon a trial de novo, appellee's judgment was
reduced to $98 and all costs incurred in the justice's court, &c.,
and from this judgment appellant has appealed to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WIMSoN, J.-It appears from the evidence that appellee's trunk
contained one sample liquid cooler, nickel-plated; one ventilated
beer faucet, one wrench and one lemon squeezer, which were samples being carried for the purpose of effecting sales.
It is contended by appellant, and correctly, that these articles
did not constitute baggage. By baggage is understood such articles
of personal convenience, or necessity, as are usually carried by
passengers for their personal use, and not merchandise or other
valuables, although carried in the same trunk, of a passenger, but
which are not, however, designed for any such use, but for other
purposes, such as sale and the like. W. & W.'s Con. Rep., sects.
614, 1254, 1255; Hutchinson on Carriers, sects. 679, 685;
Thompson on Carriers of Pass. 510.
But appellee replies to this that the trunk and its contents were
received by the company as baggage, the agent of the company
who received it as such having knowledge, at the time, of the- con.
tents of the trunk, and that therefore the company is estopped by
the act of its agent from now denying that the same was baggage.
It was proved that at the time of taking passage upon the company's train with his trunk, the appellee notified the ticket agent
of the appellant, from whom he purchased his ticket, that his trunk
contained the sample liquid cooler, but it is not shown that this
notice extended to other articles in the trunk. With this knowledge
that the trunk contained the liquid cooler the ticket agent checked
it to Longview.
We believe it to be a reasonable and correct doctrine that where
a railroad company, through its ticket or baggage agent, receives
articles for transportation of baggage, knowing at the time that
such articles are not properly baggage, the company will be
responsible therefor as a common carrier, and will be estopped from
denying that the same was baggage, at least to the extent that its
agent'had notice of the character of the articles : Butler v. Hudson
River, Railway, 3 E. D. Smith 571; Redfield on Carriers, sect.
Voz,. XXXI.-48

-
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78 and notes; 2 Redfield on Railways, p. 46 and notes; Hutchinson on Carriers, sect. 685.
But the evidence further shows that the trunk and its contents
were safely transported by the company to Longview, the place to
which the same had been checked, and were in the depot at that
place subject to the order of appellee; that appellee, soon after the
arrival of the trunk at Longview, called at the depot with his
baggage check and informed the agent in charge that he contemplated travelling on the company's road again in a day or so, and
the aggnt told him he could leave his trunk in the depot until he
got ready to go on the train, and retain his baggage check until
then. It is not proved, nor is it pretended, that the agent of the
compaiy at Longview had any knowledge of the contents of the
trunk at.the time he gave permission for it to remain in the
depot, or at any other time. It is contended by appellee that as
the agent at Longview allowed the trunk to remain in -the depot
upon the prospect of appellee's again becoming a passenger upon
appellant's road, this would render the company liable for the
trunk and its contents as baggage. As a general rule we believe
this proposition to be correct: Redfield on Railways, 39 and 40;
Redfield on Carriers, sect. 73.
But would this character of liability attach to the company when
the articles left were not baggage, and when the company, through
its agents at the place where so left, has no notice that the articles
were not baggage ?
In this case the agent of the company at Longview received the
trunk as baggage, and without notice of its contents he allowed it
to remain in the depot, and while there it was destroyed by a fire
which also destroyed the depot. If he had received notice of the
contents of the trunk, that the same were not properly baggage,
and with this knowledge had permitted it to remain in the depot
with the prospect of appellee's taking passage on- the road, we
think the company would clearly be liable as a common carrier for
its loss. But in the absence of such knowledge of the contents of
the trunk on the part of the agent at Longview, we are of opinion
that the liability of the company is that of a warehouseman, and
not that of a common carrier. It is clear from the evidence that
the trunk had reached its destination under the contract of
carriage. That contract had been fully performed on the part of
the company, and no further liability as a common carrier attached
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to the company in regard to the trunk. Any further liability as a.
common carrier could, therefore, be created only by a new contract,
and in making any such contract neither the agent at Longview
nor the company would be chargeable with the knowledge possessed
by the agent at Big Sandy of the contents of. the trunk.
With reference to the delivery of the goods to the consignee, this
must be construed to mean that if the consignee, within a reasonable time, does not demand the goods, the carrier's liability as such
will cease. In the case of baggage the rule seems to be that the
responsibility as carrier continues until the owner has bad reasonable time and opportunity to come and take it away. After that
the responsibility as carrier ceases and the carrier becomes a mere
warehouseman, and liable as such only. "It is the duty of a railway company in regard to the baggage of a passenger which has
re'ached its destination, to have the baggage ready for delivery
upon the platform at the usual place of delivery, until the owner,
in the exercise of due diligence, can call for and receive it, and it
is the owner's dhty to call for and remove it within a -easonable
time. If he does not so call for and receive it, it is the company's
duty to put it into its baggage room and keep it for him, being
liable only as warehouseman. And the reasonable time within
which the owner must call for it, is directly upon its arrival, making
reasonable allowance for delay caused by the crowded state of the
depot at that time, and the lateness of the hour makes no difference
if the baggage be put upon the platform." Quimit v. ifenshaw,
35 Vt. 605; Hutchinson on Carriers 707, 712 ; Edwards on Bailments, sect. 227; Story on Bailments, sect. 213: Redfield on
Carriers, sect. 73.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in this case limits the
liability of appellant for the loss of appellee's trunk and its contents
to that of a warehouseman, and such being the case, and it being
shown by appellant that the property was destroyed by fire, the
burden of proof devolved upon appellee to show that the loss was
occasioned by negligence on the part of appellant, its servants, employees or agents: W. & W.'s Con. Rep., sects. 118, 412, 414;
2 Texas Law Review 172.
There being no such proof in the record, the judgment must be
reversed, and .the cause remanded.
A person going upon a journey may
take with him such articles of personal

property.as may become of necessary,
conyenient, or ornamental use during the
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course of his journey. Another authority says, a passenger may carry with
him "such articles of necessity and convenience as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use and comfort, instruction and convenience, or
protection:" W1eeks v. N. Y. 6-c. Ry.
Co., 9 Hun 669.
In determining what is baggage, regard must be had to the social position
of the person whose baggage is in question : Fraloff v. N. Y. C. 4- H. R. Co.,
100 U. S. 24; and also to the object and
length of the journey : Parmelee v.
_Fscher, 22 Ill. 212.
A different rule prevails with reference to foreigners, travelling upon long
journeys, among strangers, than with
reference to persons who go for a short
trip to a neighboring village or city:
Duffy v. Thompson, 4 E. D. Smith 178.
The former are allowed more baggage
than the latter, and it may include a
greater variety of articles. Not only may
baggage include articles intended for use
during the transit, but it may also include articles intended to be used during a temporary stay at the end of the
journey; T. W. 4- W. R. Co. v. Hammond, 33 Ind. 379.
The foregoing remarks as to the
nature of baggage may seem vague and
general. But the rule as to what is
baggage can only be stated in general
terms. An enumeration of articles cannot be made. The question what articles come within the rule, is to be determined by the jury, according to the
circumstances of each case: Rawson v.
R. R. Co., 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 220;
XcGill v. Rowand, 3 Penn. St. 451.
h'Aatis and what is not baggage.Articles not intended to be used on the
passenger's trip, but being transported
merely for future prospective household
use have been held not to be baggage:
Texas P. R. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 7
A. & E. R. R. Cas. 395. Merchandise
is not baggage: Pettegrew v. Barnum,
11 Md. 434. Neither are samples

although not themselves intended to be
sold, and used for the sole purpose of
carrying on a traffic as a merchant:
Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill 586. Presents received from or intended for a
friend, a silver match-box, masonic regalia, and eugravings are none of them
properly a part of personal baggage:
Nevins v. Bay State Stmbt. Co., 4 Bosw.
225. Toys are not baggage. A child's
spring rocking-horse, 44 inches long and
weighing 78 pounds is not personal baggage entitled to be gratuitously carried:
Hudston v. Midland Ry Co., L. R., 4 Q.
B. 366. It has been decided also that
"ordinary baggage" does not include
title deeds belonging to a client, and
which an attorney is carrying with him
in his bag or portmantean to be produced
upon a trial, nor would the passenger's
own title deeds and securities fall within
the term: Phelps v. L. 4- N. W. By.
Co., 19 C. B. N. S. 321.
Government bonds are not baggage: Weeks v.
N. Y., dbc., Ry., 9 Hun 669. And no
package delivered by a traveller to be
carried on a railway to his destination
will be considered as baggage unless
represented to be such, or delivered under such circumstances as to imply that
it is baggage: Butler v. R. R. Co.,
3 E. D. Smith 571.
Wearing apparel.-Baggageof course
includes wearing apparel: Brooke v.
Pickwic, 4 Bingham 218; McGill v.
Rowan, 3 Penn. St. 451 ; W
Voods v. Devin,
13 111. 746. This means the passenger's
own wearing apparel and not that of
other people, although a husband, wife,
father, mother, or guardian may properly include as their baggage cothing
for a child, or other person in their
charge or company. It has been decided that baggage may include articles
of clothing newly purchased in New
York, but which the passenger did not
use by the way-intending to use them
at his destination-there being no fraud
practi ed upon the carrier: Dexter v.
S. B. J N. Y. Co., 42 N. Y. 326.
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Fourteen yards of linen cut into shirt
patterns, intended to be made up for
and used by the passenger is properly a
part of his wearing apparel, and if lost,
damages may be recovered therefor as
for lost baggage: Duffy v. Thompson, 4
E. D. Smith 178. A dress purchased
'for a person not in the company of the
buyer is not baggage. "Personal baggage" does not include wearing apparel
or articles bought for one's wife, or for a
girl in one's family. Much less does it
include a dress bought to present to the
passenger's landlady: Dexter v. S. B. 4N. Y. R. Co., 42 N. Y. 326.
.Tewery.-A passenger may lawfully
carry with him, as baggage, jewels and
personal ornaments appropriaie to his
wardrobe, rank, and social position:
Petigrew,v. Barnum, 11 Md. 434 ; Torpey v. Williams, 3 Daly 162. A gold
watch and chain, and finger or ear-rings
maybe so carried: M: Cormick v. Hudson
R. R?. Co., 4 E. D. Smith 181; Am.
Conv. Co. v. Cross, 8 Bush 472; Jones
v. T7oorhees, 10 Ohio 145 ; Brooke v.
I'ckwic, 4 Bing. 218. A wife's jewels
niay be carried as her husband's baggage
if she accompany him: 3 Penn. St. 451.
A gold chain customarily worn about
plaintiff's person and left by her in her
dress pocket upon retiring for the nightshe having no satchel or trunk with heris properly cared for by her. She is
chargeable with no imprudence or fault
in thus carrying them instead of placing
them in in the, hands of the carrier:
McKee v. Owen, 15 Mich. 115.
Guns and Revolvers.-It has been decided in Maryland, that a revolver is
not ordinarily a proper part of one's
personal baggage: Giles v. Fauntleroy,
13 Md. 126. The weight of authority
is the other way: Davis v. Mich. South.
Ry. Co., 22 Ill. 278 ; Woods v. Devin,
13 Id. 746. A gun worth $35 has
been held properly a part of baggage: Davis v. R. R. Co., 10 How. Pr.
330; and on an ocean steamship, Van
Horn v. Kermit, 4 E. D. Smith 453.

One revolver and no more is properly a
part of the personal baggage of a Chicago grocer, hunting butter in I6wa : C.
R. L 6- P. By. v. Collins, 56 Ill. 212.
Table-ware.-Silver teaspoons are
not baggage : Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13
Md. 126. It may be doubted whether
even a small quantity of table-ware can
be regarded as baggage: Hannibal By.
v. S wft, 12 Wall. 262.
Tools.-A harness-maker's or carpenter's tools are properly baggage when
taken with them, while going to their
work : Porterv. Hildebrand,14 Penn. St.
129 ; Davis v.1B. _?., 10 How. Pr. 330.
So are a surgeon's instruments, Hannibal Ry. v. Swi, 12 Wall. 262.
Books.-Manuscript books to be studied by a student, on his way to school,
or containing a commercial traveller's
price-lists, are baggage : Hopkins v.
Wdstcott, 6 Blatch. 64; Gleason v. Goodrich Trans. Co., 32 Wis. 85.
Bedding.-Some conflict of opinion
exists as to whether bedding is baggage
or not. It has been intimated that a
pair of sheets or the like taken by a
passenger for his own use on a journey,
might perhaps be considered as baggage:
Madcrow v. Gt. West. By., L. R., 6 Q. B.
612. But the court in the same case decided that six pairs of sheets, six pairs
of blankets, and six quilts in a trunk
taken by a passenger, who had abandoned his residence in Canada, and was
journeying from Liverpool to London,
where he intended to use the articles in his
household, were not baggage. So it has
been held that a featherbed not intended
for use en route was not baggage: Connolly v. Warren, 106 Mass 146. But in
Vermont it has been decided that a bed,
pillows, bolster, and bed-quilts belonging to a poor man who was moving with
his wife, is properly baggage and not
merchandise: Quimit v. Henshaw, 35
Vt. 604. ,
Money.-The authorities seem to
agree that large sums of money, exceeding in amount the funds necessary to de-
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fray current or immediately contingent
expenses is not baggage although carried
in a traveller's trunk or valise. This
was decided as to $4000 in gold carried
in a carpet-bag on a canal boat: Doyle
v. Kiser, 6 Ind. 242 ; see also Orange
Co. Bk. v. Brown, 9 Wend. 85; Davis
v. Mich. So. Ry. Co., 22 Ill. 278;
Phelps v. L. 4- N. W. By. Co., 19 C.
B. N. S. 321 ; Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6
Hill 586. But such sums as may be
necessary for expenses may be carried as
baggage. A passenger going to a foreign country may keep such funds in his
trunk while upon shipboard : Duffy v.
Thompson, 4 E. D. Smith 176. $800 in
gold has been held recoverable in a suit
for lost baggage: Merrill v. Grinnell,
30 N. Y. 594; see also Weeks v. N. Y.
etc. Ry. Co., 9 Hun 669; Parmelee v.
Fischer, 22 111.212 ; Torpeyv. Williams,
3 Daly 162; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Copsland, 24 Ill. 332 ; Davis v. Mich. South.
By. Co., 22 I1. 278 ; Del Vale v. Stmbt.
Richmond, 27 La. Ann. 90. Butmoney
to the extent of $4000 kept upon the
person of the passenger, the carrier having no notice thereof, can neither be regarded as part of the baggage nor as
money intended to defray the expenses
of the journey, and in case of the destruction of the money by fire together
with the passenger carrying it, the carrier is not liable although the disaster be
caused by its negligence: First Nat.
Bank v. M1. 4- 0. Ry. Co., 20 Ohio St.
259. So, also, an .innkeeper has been
held not liable for sonic $5225 worth of
gold dust in a guest's trunk in his room,
and of which the botel-keeper had not
been notified: Julius v. Miller, 7 La.
Ann. 360.
Who is responsiblefor baggage.-Itis,
perhaps, too broad a statement to say
that railway carriers, steamboat men,
and innkeepers, in all cases incur the
same liability for baggage. But it may
be truly said that their rights and duties
in the care of baggage of guests and
passengers are analogous. It is similar

upon principle and in fact. All are insurers. The liability of each is grounded
upon (1) public policy, and (2) contract.
Especially are steamboat proprietors,
and perhaps sleeping-car companies analogous to innkeepers. They hold out
to a passenger the same assurances that
an innkeeper holds out to a guest occu-"
pying a bed-room at an inn. And the
responsibility is very similar : McKee v.
Owen, 15 Mich. 115; Mudgett v. Bay
State Stmbt. Co., I Daly 151 ; Pettigrew
v. Barnum, II Md. 434 ; but see Clark
v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275. But, although
carriers are liable to the same extent as
innkeepers, their liability is not like
that of innkeepers, simply one of custody
and safe-keeping. Carriage and transportation is the principal object. The
obligation relates to the mode ofcarrying:
McKee v. Owen, 15 Mich. 115.
Where there are several persons or
companies interested in a railway or
other means of conveyance, it may be
questionable who is the carrier. It has
been decided that trustees in possession
of and operating a railway, are common
carriers liable for baggage received for
carriage and lost: Barter v. Wheeler,
49 N. H. 9. It has been intimated, too,
that subordinates of Commissioners of
Emigration who took baggage in charge,
or who were intrusted with its safe-keeping were liable as carriers for its loss:
Klein v. Packett Co., 3 Daly 390. But
a state law regulating the carriage of
baggage is not applicable to a foreign
corporation carrying the baggage into
another state: Brown v. R. R1. Co., 83
Penn. St. 316. It is the duty of a sleeping-car company, although it is not,
strictly speaking, a common carrier of
passengers, to use reasonable and ordinary care to prevent intruding, picking
pockets and carrying off the clothes of
passengers while asleep. Whether such
care was exercised or not is a question
for the jury. Where the regulations of
the company require a watchman to stay
in the aisle of the car continuously until
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danger is over, and he goes out of the
aisle even for a few minutes during
which time a robbery occurs, the company
is liable, provided the jury believe that if
the watchman had been in his place of
observation, it would not have occurred
without detection. The watching must
be continuous and active. And it may
be proved, as bearing upon the question
of negligence that another person was
robbed upon the same night in the same
car : Pulman P. C. Co. v. Gardner, S. C.
Pae., 14 Weekly Notes 17 ; see also Woodruff v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474; Pullman
P. C. Co. v. Smith, 73 Ill. 360; Dieh/l
v. Woodruff, (Indiana) 10 C. L. J. 66;
Welsh v. Pullman, P. C. Co., 43 N. Y.
(S. C.) 457; Palmeter v. Wagner, 11
Alb. L. J. 221 ; Blum v.P. P. C. Co.,
(U. S. Ct. Tenn.) 3 Cent. L. J. 591 ;
Nevin v.P. P. C. Co., 16 Cent. L. J.
301.
Continuance of Liability.-The general rule is that a carrier's liability for
baggage continues as long as the relation
of carrier and passenger lasts, and for
such a period of time thereafter as will
reasonably suffice for the passenger to
remove the baggage. What is a reasonable time in which to remove baggage
depends upon all the circumstances of
each case and is to be decided by a jury.
Several cases are worth noticing. Where
a trans-atlantic steamer's voyage ended
at Hoboken, and the baggage of a passenger going to New York, was placed
upon the dock in Hoboken where it was
examined by the custom house officers
and placed in a barge provided by commissioners of emigration, and the passenger received from them a check for
the baggage, and himself took passage
in the barge for New York, and saw his
trunk on the barge both before and after
leaving it at New York, but it was subsequently not to be found, it was decided
thut the steamship company's obligations
as a common carrier had ceased: Klein
v. H. A. P. Co., 3 Daly 390. But in

another case the same court decided that
where a person was a passenger from
Liverpool to New York, the delivery of
the baggage to the Emigrant Commissioners' barge was but a continuation of
the liability which did not cease until the
baggage was safely delivered at Castle
Garden : Torpey v. Williams, 3 Daly
162. So also it has been decided that
where a railway company employs porters at its stations to carry passengers'
baggage from the railway carriages to
the carriages employed by passengers,
the liability of the company as a carrier
continues until the porters have discharged their duty: Richards v. L. B.
4 S. C. Ry., 7 M., G. & S. 839.
Several cases present instances of delay by passengers in calling for baggage,
notwithstanding which the company was
held liable as a carrier. Thus where
the train arrived several hours late, at
the same time with other belated trains,
and there was such a number of cars
that the car in which plaintiff was riding
had to be left outside the depot, and the
weather was inclement, and the hour
late, and plaintiff went directly to her
hotel and did not call for her baggage
until next morning, this was held
not unreasonable delay : Cary v. R. R.
Co., 29 Barb. 35; Penna. R. R. Co.
v. M3filler, I Ohio, St. 514. A passenger's baggage was speedily locked
up, on her arrival and she waited some
time trying to get it without success.
About three hours later her husband sent
a man and team with his son to get it.
The son went to the baggageman's
house and prevailed upon him to come
and open the door and release the baggage, but before this could be done and
the baggage be loaded the man with the
team became impatient and drove away.
No other conveyance could be had, and
the baggageman consented to keep the
trunk until morning. During the night
it was broken open and rifled: Held
(two judges dissenting), that the liability
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of the common carrier continued : Diviny
v.
..
. H. R. Co.,49 N. Y.
546.

A guest at a hotel paid his bill in the
morning [which entitled him to his room
for the remainder of the day], and directed the hotel keeper to send his trunk
to the steamer at 4 P. t. Ile left money
to pay the porter. The trunk was delivered to the porter but lost between the
hotel and the steamer. Held, that the
hotel keeper continued liable: Giles v.
Fontelroy, 13 Md. 126.
If in violation of his contract as a
common carrier, defendant takes plaintiff's trunk beyond the latter's destination, the defendant's liability as a carrier
continues: T. W. 4- W. Ry. Co., v.
HUammond, 33 Ind. 379.
Railway carriers are liable as common
carriers until the baggage is ready for delivery to the owner at the end of his jour-

ney on their road, and until be has had a
reasonable opportunity of receiving and
removing it. The question of reasonable opportunity is a mixed question of
law and fact depending upon the peculiar
circumstances of each case : Louisville
R. R. Co. v. Mahan, 8 Bush 184; 49
N. Y. 546 ; Mfote v. . 4- N. W. BRy.
Co., 27 Iowa 22 ; Roth v. R. R. Co.,
34 N. Y. 548. But after the lapse of
such time the liability of the carrier does
not cease. It becomes a different kind
of liability-that of warehouseman. As
warehouseman the carrier is not an
insurer of the baggage, but is liable for
want of ordinary care in keeping and
preserving it: Burnell v. N. Y. C. R.
Co., 45 N. Y. 184; Powell v. Myers,
26 Vend. 591 ; Roth v. R. R. Co., 34
N. Y. 548.
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Supreme Court of Micigan.
WHITING v. OHLERT.
A lease may be made to take effect in the future and the estate begins with the
future period, and not with the contract.
An agreement by. parol for a future term, not exceeding one year, is valid, and
not within the Statute of Frauds.

ERROR to Wayne.
Stewart .- Galloway, for plaintiff and appellant.
James H. Pound, for defendant.
CAMPBELL, J.-This was an action by a tenant against his landlord for the disturbance in his enjoyment. The main dispute was
concerning the validity of the lease. The testimony tended to show
an agreement by parol in April for a year's tenancy from the
beginning of Alay. The court below held that an agreement by
parol for a full term of a year, to begin in the future, was void
under the Statute of Frauds. That statute provides that all contracts "for the leasing for more than one year" of lands shall be
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void unless in writing: Comp. Laws, sect. 3179. The only other
provision supposed to be involved is that which declares that every
agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one
year must be in writing: Id. sect. 3183.
The distinction between an agreement for a lease and the lease
itself was pointed out in Tillman v. Fuller,13 Mich. 113. It is
very well settled that a lease may be made to take effect in future,
and that the estate does not begin with the contract, but with the
future period: Young v. Dake, 5 N. Y. 463; Trull v. Granger,
8 N. Y. 115; Wood v. Rubbell, 10 N. Y. 479. It is held in New
York, under a statute corresponding to ours, that an agreement by
parol for a future term not exceeding one year is valid, and not
within the statute: Younq v. Dake, supra. That case is well
considered, and is, we think, a fair construction of the statute,
which ought not to be given a strained meaning. The same doctrine has been adhered to in that state, and is reaffirmed emphatically in Becar v. Flues, 64 N. Y. 518, where a tenant was
held liable for the agreed rent, who had never gone into possession,
and had declined to do so. Concurring, as we do, in this view of
the law, we think the court below erred in its ruling, and should
have allowed a recovery of damages, for the injury done plaintiff.
We note further in the record that the right of possession seems
to have been determined in plaintiff's favor in proceedings before a
commissioner, and we cannot understand why on any theory his
recovery, to some extent at least, was questionable. But as tenant
for a year he was of course entitled to larger damages.
The judgment must be reversed with costs, and a new trial
granted.'

Supreme Court of Oregon.
WHITE v. HOLLAND, ET AL.
A lease of land for a year, to commence in futuro, is "an agreement not to be
performed within a year," within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds, and must
be in writing; otherwise it is invalid.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Multnomah
County.
I See note to next case, p. 387.
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On January 20th, 1881, the respondents made a parol lease of
certain premises to the appellant for the term of one year, to commence on March 1st, ensuing. Before the latter date, however,
they disclaimed their agreement and refused to give possession.
The appellant then brought this action for damages for breach of
the agreement, alleging the foregoing facts in his complaint, and
upon a trial by jury obtained a verdict for $500. The court below
set the verdict aside, and afterward rendered judgment on the
pleadings for the respondents. Both these rulings were made on
the ground that the parol lease was an agreement not to be performed within a year, and therefore invalid under the Statute of
Frauds adopted in this state.
This appeal was taken from such order and judgment.
A. E1. Tanner, for the appellant.

Vm. Strong & Sons, for the respondent.
WATSON, C. J.-The principal question presented by this appeal
is whether a parol lease of lands for a year, to commence infuturo,
is "an Agreement not to be performed within a year," within the
meaning of our Statute of Frauds, and therefore invalid.
This identical question appears to have been already decided in
the affirmative by this court in a previous case: Pulse v. Hamer,
8 Or. 251.
The distinction which appellant's counsel has sought to draw
between the two cases is manifestly unsound. The facts stated in
the opinion in that case raise the precise question presented here,
and the principle announced is equally applicable to both. But if
the point could be regarded as still open, we should not hesitate to
adopt the views of the court in that case as correct under the provisions of our statute. These provisions must be construed with
reference to the context as it appears in the code. The code itself
is an original act, and the rule of construing by the context is fully
applicable. These provisions are found under the title " of indispensable evidence." They cover all the subjects usually embraced
in the Statute of Frauds adopted in other states, and they stand in
such order and connection that there is no ground for saying, as in
the later decisions in New York and those of Iowa, that the
declaration that "an agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof is void," applies
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only to personal property and choses in action, and does not affect
transfers or leases of realty. If this provision does apply to leases
of real property in this state, and we can perceive no reason from
the context for excluding them from the operation of such general
language, then it will accord with all the authorities to hold the
lease involved in this action invalid.
For a lease for a year to commence at a future time is an agreement that by its terms it is not to be performed within a year from
the making thereof: Wolf v. Dozer, 22 Kan. 436; Atwood v.
NYorton, 31 Ga. 507; Delano v. Montague, 4 Cush. 42.
We think, therefore, that it must be regarded as settled in this
state that a parol lease of real property for a year, to commence in
futuro, is invalid, as being in conflict with such provision.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
The points adjudicated in the two
principal cases are certainly of great
importance and interest. There can be
no doubt that, as stated by the learned
judge who delivered the opinion in the
case of Whiting v. Oldert, it is well
settled that a lease for years may be
made to take effect in futuro, and that
the estate does not begin with the contract, but with the future period. See
Taylor on Land. & Ten., sect. 72. A
careful reading of the case of Young v.
Dake, 5 N. Y. 463, will, it is believed,
satisfy any unprejudiced mind as to the
correctness of the decision both of that
case and of the principal case above
referred to. Besides the cases referred
to by the court, see Taggardv. Roosevelt, 2 E. D. Smith 100 ; Sobey v. Brisbee, 20 Ia. 105 ; Huffman v. Startes, 31
Ind. 474; Fall v. Hazlerigg, 45 Ind.
576 ; Allen v. Devlin, 6 Bosw. I ; s. c.
nom. Smith v. Devlin, 23 N. Y. 363.
See, however, Qlt v. Lohnas, 19Ill. 576 ;
Whleder v. Frankenthal, 78 Ill. 125,
where a contrary conclusion was arrived
at upon the construction of a similar
statute. No authorities are cited by
the court in the former case in support of their position, and the second
case follows the first in that direction.
Where, however, the statutes, as did the

English Statute of 29 Chas. II., c., 3,
contain the words, CC
all leases not exceeding the term of three years (or one
year as in many of the United States)
from the making thereof," a different
conclusion may well be arrived at in
those cases where the term contracted
for will not expire till after the statutory
limitation from the making of the contract. See Taylor on Land. & Ten.,
sect. 34.
As to the point described in White v.
Holland, our opinion has always been
that the provision respecting agreements
ccnot to be performed within the space
of one year, &c.," did not refer to
verbal leases ; and a careful perusal of
the principal case, of the case of Pulsev.
Hamaer, 8 Or. 251 (in which say the
court in the principal case, this identical
question appears to have been already
decided in accordance with the ruling in
the principal case), and other cases holding the same doctrine does not satisfy us
of the incorrectness of our opinion. The
case of Pulse v. Hamer, as we understand it, decides nothing of the sort; but
does decide that "where one man agrees
by parol to lease land to another for a
term of years to begin in the future, and
agrees at the same time to put such
parol contract in writing, and no con-
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sideration passes between the parties,
either party may disregard the parol
contract, and if the lessee go on the land
at the commencement of the term named
in the parol agreement without the request of the lessor, his possession thus
obtained will not give him any rights
under such parol contract. The point
decided in the second principal case is
not, however, without support by the
authorities. Besides the cases cited by
the court, see Roberts v. Tennell, 3 T. B.
Mon. 247 ; Comstock v. Ward, 22 fI1.
248; Olt v. Lohnas, 19 Ill. 576 ;
and Wheeler v. Frankenthal, 78 Ill. 125.
With respect to these cases and the ones
cited in the principal case, it is to be observed that, with the exception of the
case of* Oft v. Lohnas, they either assume the point in controversy and decide
the question without argument, or follow
the case of Edge v. Straford, decided

in the Exchequer in 1831, 1 Cromp. &
Jer. 391. The reasoning of the court in
Olt v. Lohnas, is to our mind unsatisfactory, and the better doctrine is believed to be that deducible from the
cases of Birckhead v. Cummins, 33 N. J.
Law 44, and Huffmana v. Storees, 31
Ind. 474. The authorities will be found
collected and considered in these cases,
both of which are very well considered
cases. See, also, Brown on the Statute
of Frauds, sects. 37, 37 a ; Young v.
Dake, 5 N. Y. 463; Sobey v. Brisbeep
20 Ia. 105 ; Tagard v. Roosevelt, 2
E. D. Smith 100 ; Fall Y. Hazlerigg, 45
Ind. 576. On the whole, we are of the
opinion that the doctrine of the Michigan
case, which, involves the pOint decided
by the Supreme Court of Oregon, is the
more reasonable and better doctrine.
MAesH.&nn D. Ewira..
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH Ex REL. SELLERS v. PH(ENIX IRON CO. ET AL.
A shareholder in a corporation is entitled to a mandamus to compel the officers
holding corporate documents to allow him an inspection and copies of them at reasonable times for a specific and profer purpose, upon showing a refusal on'their part to
allow such inspection.
Where a shareholder alleges that the majority of the stock is held by certain officers of the corporation, who control its business, manage its affairs to advance their
private interests and deny him all access to, or opportunity for inspection of, the
corporate books and papers, and that he is about to file a bill in equity to restrain such
illegal management, lie is entitled to a mandamus to compel the officers to allow him
to inspect books and papers which contain information on the subject of his complaint.

from Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia.
This was a petition by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, at
WRIT or ERROR

the relation of George H. Sellers, against a corporation known as

The Phoenix Iron Company, and the president, directors, treasurer
and secretary of the company, praying for a writ of alternative
mandamus requiring tle defendants to give to relator and his clerks
at reasonable times, access to certain of the books and papers of the
corporation.
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The petition set forth that the capital of the corporation was
$500,000, divided into 5000 shares; that on Nov. 29th 1866, the
relator bought 238 shares for $38,500, and still held 234 of
them; that the president and one of the directors were the holders
of nearly all the balance of the stock; that the corporation was doing
a business of over $2,000,000 per annum and making large profits ;
that no dividend had been made for nine years ; that the president
and the director above referred to, controlled the affairs of the
corporation and managed it for their own personal interests through
a contract between the corporation and a firm, of which they and
another director were members ; that the corporation had transferred to trustees valuable real estate to secure an alleged indebtedness to the grandfather of the president and the director above
referred to ; that the relator had been denied all information as to
the business; that he attended a stockholder's meeting, but that
the minutes were not permitted to be read; the examination of
papers was prevented and the meeting forcibly adjourned while he
was asking for information; that the relator had by letter and in
person requested that a time and place might be named when
he might examine such books and papers as would give him
information concerning inventories, bills receivable, salaries, minutes
of meetings, &c., which requests were declined; that petitioner
proposed to file a bill in equity against the corporation and its
officers on account of the matters above set forth, and that it was
necessary for him to see the books and papers of the corporation in
order that he might make a correct statement of facts.
The court below granted a rule to show cause why the mandamus
should not issue, which rule after argument it discharged. The
petitioner took this writ of error.
Samuel W. Pennypacker and Johtn G. Jolnson, for plaintiff in
error.
'Wayne Me J'eagh and B. C. AlcAurtrie, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TRuNKEY, J.-The right of shareholders in large partnerships
and companies to inspect accounts, is usually qualified by express
agreement, but it requires no express agreement to confer the
right, for that is a consequence of partnership. If a company's
deeds of settlement provide for the inspection of its accounts by
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its shareholders at certain times and subject to certain restrictions,
it seems they are not entitled to inspect the accounts otherwise :
Lindley on Part. 809. This writer also says that the right of
inspection of the accounts of such companies is necessarily limited,
for if every shareholder were at liberty to examine the accounts
whenever he desired to do so, it would be impracticable ever to
keep them or make them up in a proper manner; and he apprehends where there is no agreement to the contrary, the shareholders are entitled to have them produced at their meetings and
to appoint persons to inspect and examine them. Perhaps nobody
would question the correctness of these views. But they do not
reach the case of a minority powerless by vote to call for production of the books, or to make appointment of persons to inspect.
In the absence of agreement, every shareholder has the right to
inspect the accounts, a right subject to the necessities of the company's business, yet existing. It has never been asserted that a
partner in a large company, under pretence of inconvenience, can
at all times be lawfully denied inspection of its accounts, unless the
denial rests upon his own agreement. For proper purposes and at
reasonable times, the law gives him the right, even if its exercise
be inconvenient to the bookkeepers and managers of the partnership business. Unless the charter provides otherwise, a shareholder in a trading corporation has the right to inspect its books
and papers and to take minutes from them for a definite and
proper purpose, at reasonable times. The doctrine of the law is,
that the books and papers of the corporation, though of necessity
kept in some one hand, are the common property of all the stockholders: Angell & Ames Corp., s. 681; Redfield on Railways
227; Grant on Corp. 31; 2 Phillips on Ev. 313; Martin v.
Bienville Oil Works, 28 La. Ann. 204. Cases may have been
rare in which it was held that a shareholder was entitled to
an extfaordinary remedial writ for the enforcement of his right to
inspect the books, but that does not evidence non-existence of
the right. Text books and dicta of courts seem to have treated the
right of shareholders in joint stock corporations to inspect the
accounts and papers, as similar to that of members in large partnerships where managers are appointed to transact the business.
The necessary limitations practically prevent exercise of the right
for speculative purposes or gratification of curiosity; if every
shareholder could inspect for such purposes at his own will, the
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business of most corporations would be greatly impeded. In Rex
v. Merchant Tailors' Co., 2 Barn. & Ad. 115, TAUNTON, J., said:
"There is no express rule that to warrant an application to inspect
corporation documents, there must actually have been a suit instituted; but it is necessary that there should be some particular
matter in dispute between members or between the corporation
and individuals in it, there must be some controversy, some specific
purpose in respect of which the examination becomes necessary."
This concisely puts the circumstances in which the shareholder
may have specific remedy if refused permission to inspect corporation documents and books; but if the right itself were not clear
he could not have that remedy at all. It was conceded at the
argument that a mandamus may be issued to a private corporation
to compel the exercise of a franchise, or to restore an evicted
person to his office or membership, or to compel performance of a
duty imposed on a corporate official, expressly or by implication.
The old rule was that the writ was only to be issued in cases of
public interest or having some relation to public officers or rights:
Tapping on Mand. 12, 97. But the tendency in modern times is
to grant a mandamus in certain cases where formerly it would
have been refused; and the prerogative writ will go to compel
"the production to a shareholder for a proper purpose and at a
,proper time of such books as he has a right to inspect :" Lindley
on Part. 1037. And this was said of the writ and cases without
the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, plainly showing that the
distinguished author was of opinion that the right of a shareholder
to inspect the books of the corporation of which he is a member
exists at common law, and in a proper case may be enforced by
mandamus. "Corporators have always, on showing a good reason,
though not for curiosity's sake, a right of access to, and inspection
of, all the books, muniments and papers belonging to the corporation, and if this general right be denied or obstructed, a mandamus
to inspect may be had on proof of the refusal of the right to, and
reason for, the inspection:" Grant on Corp. 311; Angell & Ames
on Corp., s. 707; High on Extra. Leg. Rem. 380. In Rex v. Aiferchant Tailors' Co., supra, decided half a century ago, it was held
that the court will not grant an application by members of a corporate body for a mandamus to inspect the documents of the corporation unless it be shown that such inspection is necessary with
reference to some specific dispute or question depending in which
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the parties applying are interested; and the inspection then will
only be granted to such extent as may be necessary for the particular occasion; and the writ was refused because the applicants
merely alleged grounds on which they believed the affairs of the
corporation were improperly conducted, and the officers unduly
chosen and complained of mismanagement in some particular
instances not affecting themselves or any other matter then in dispute. The doctrine declared in that case is the foundation of the
rule in the text-books, and the writ was refused solely on the
insufficiency of the affidavits to make a case within the rule.
Thirty years afterwards, CROMPTON, J., referring to Bex v. l3ferchant Tailors' (Jo., as a leading case, said: "I take the result of
the cases to be that a mandamus may go against a corporation at
the instance of a member of the corporation to inspect and see
whether he can raise a particular case in his favor by examining
the books. It must, in my view, be a case with reference to some
defined distinct dispute as to which it appears that it might be to
his advantage to see the minutes of the corporation." After
noting the contention of the company that a remedy existed by
quo warranto,he adds: " The applicant who has no access to the
documents of the corporation, would be able to make an affidavit
of belief only as to the existence of the custom on which he founds
his claims, while the corporation who hold all the books might set
forth the entries making against the existence of the custom, and
thus from want of access to the books the party might be prevented from getting this rule." A mandamus was awarded for the
applicant and his attorney to inspect the minutes of the corporation as to the elections of the assistants, that being the matter in
dispute: Burton v. The Saddlqrs' Co., 31 Law Jour. Rep. 62.
In the late case of Martin v. Bienville Oil Works, 28 La. Ann.
204, it was ruled that a stockholder of the corporation has a right
to know how its affairs are conducted; that the board of directors
authorized by the charter to exercise all the powers of the corporation could not rightfully deprive him of personal inspection of the
books and papers that he might learn the condition and affairs of
the company so that he could vote understandingly at a meeting
of the stockholders, and upon showing that the directors had concealed from him the facts, he is entitled to relief by mandamus.
One of the judges on the ground that a stockholders right to
inspect is strictly personal, dissented from so much of the order as
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allowed inspection by agent-upon the main question there was no
division. This case may go farther than is necessary for protection of the interests of individual shareholders, and is not cited for
unqualified approval. Were it established that every stockholder
may have a mandamus to enforce his right of inspection for the
mere purpose of enabling him to vote understandingly where the
stockholders are numerous, there would likely result great inconvenience and hindrance in the conduct of the business of the corporation. The interests of all the corporators require that the
writ shall not go at the caprice of the curious or suspicious. It
would seem, from the weight of authority and in reason, that a
shareholder is entitled to mandamus to compel the custos of corporate documents to allow him an inspection and copies of them at
reasonable times, for a specific and proper purpose, upon showing
a refusal on the part of the custos to allow it and not otherwise.
What would be a fit occasion is Ivell indicated by the remarks of
the court in Burton v. The Saddlers' Co., and they apply in case
of other grievances of a shareholder as well as to the particular
one of which he was speaking. Among the cases cited at argament are two, where it is said that mandamus is confined to cases
of a public nature, and will not be awarded to a trading corporation. In King v. Bank of England, 2 B. & Aid. 620, the application was by a stockholder for the writ to compel the governor
and company of the bank to produce their accounts and declare a
dividend. The King v. London Assurance Co., 5 B. & Ald.
899, was a petition for a mandamus to compel a transfer of shares
standing in the name of a bankrupt stockholder to his assignees.
There was no ground for the writ in either case. The examination of accounts and division of profits may effectually be gone
into in a court of equity. For a refusal to transfer shares of stock,
the injured party has an adequate remedy in an action for damages.
But the decisions are based on the old rule which has been superseded, so far as'the opinions go.
Statutory regulations in some states respecting the rights of
shareholders to inspect the books and muniments of corporations,
and cases within such statutes, cast little if any light on the question now pending. It cannot be inferred from these enactments
in other states, that in this there is no such right of inspection at
common law, or that in a fitting case a shareholder shall not have
the appropriate remedy to secure its enjoyment specifically.
VOL. XXXII.--50
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Has the relator shown such facts as entitled him to an alternative
mandamus? The capital stock of the corporation is $500,000, divided
into shares of $100 each, a majority of which is owned by David
Reeves, President, and William H. Reeves one of the directors. Its
works are extensive and its business apparently prosperous, for the
last ten years averaging over $2,000,000 per annum; yet no dividend has been declared for the last nine gears. In 1866 the relator
purchased 238 shares of the stock for $38,500, and still owns 234
shares. The principal part of the business of the corporation has
been absorbed by a partnership in name of Clark, Reeves & Co.
The said David Reeves and the said William H. Reeves and John
Griffin, a director of said corporation, are partners and a majority of
the partners in said firm of Clark, Reeves & Co., and the relator
avers that there is a contract of co-partnership between the corporation and said firm, and that said president and two directors take
advantage of their positions to advance their private interests as
members of the firm to the disadvantage of the corporation. Every
director holds a salaried position under the corporation. In 1875
the corporation transferred real estate of great value to secure
alleged indebtedness to the estate of David Reeves, the trustees
being interested in said estate. Although a large stockholder, for
a long time the relator has enjoyed neither income from his stock
nor the privilege of knowing how the receipts from the business of
the corporation are expended. His knowledge of the conduct of the
business is that which is common to strangers, to the public. At a
meeting of the stockholders, he asked for information and they
refused to permit the minutes to be read, or papers to be examined.
His request to the president of the company that a time and place
would be named when and where it would be convenient for him to
examine such books as would give him information of the items of
inventories, bills receivable, salaries of officers and minutes of meetings was refused. His demand at the office of the corporation
during business hours, of the officers and directors, for access to the
books and papers which would give him information upon subjects
which he named was refused. In those things that he named he
is as directly interested as any other stockholder; but'they are
concealed from him by the directors and officers of the corporation
who own a majority of the stock. The surface indications are that
the business of the corporation has been profitable as well as large
and that the profits have been wrongfully appropriated by those who
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control the business, to the injury of the relator. Were an inner
view permitted, he might see that there had been no profits, no misappropriation of moneys, and that all that has been done was done
for the interest of every shareholder. The relator avers that he
purposes filing a bill in equity against the corporation and its
officers, and that it is necessary that he see the books and papers
in order that he may correctly state the facts now concealed from
him. Upon learning the facts he may abandon his purpose for
want of matter of complaint. He desires "to inspect and see
whether he can raise a particular case in his favor by examining
the books." Upon 'the verity of the facts set forth in his petition
we are of opinion that he is entitled to an alternative mandamus.
The writ should not extend to any books and papers other than
such as contain information upon the subjects specified in the prayer
and petition. The order discharging the rule to show cause, is
reversed, and judgment for the Commonwealth that an alternative
mandamus be issued. Record remitted for further proceedings.
1. Inspection generally.-Every corporator has a right to inspect all tile
records, books and other documents
of the corporation upon all proper
occasions; and if upon application for
that purpose, the officer who has the
custody of them refuse to show them,
mandamus lies to enforce the right:
Rem v. Shelley, 3 Term Rep. 142 ; Rex
v. Babb, Id. 580 ; Harrisonv. lVilliains,
3 Barn. & Cres. 162; -ogers v. Jones,
5 D. & R. 484 ; Cockburn v. Union Bank,
13 La. Ann. 289.
A stockholder cannot be deprived
of the right to inspect the books of his
company because they are kept in a
particular manner, or because they contain besides the information to which he
is entitled, other information which he
has no right to demand. Nor is a
from granting
corporation excused
inspection because it does not keep the
books which the statutes prescribe. It
is its duty to permit an inspection of
such as it does keep for the purpose
of recording the transactions which tie
statutes give the stockholder a right to

know: People v. Pacilic,1MailSteansldp
Co., 50 Barb. 280.

If a shareholder's rights in respect to
examining books are not restricted by
the charter, or by rules and by-laws
passed in conformity thereto, a stockholder in a banking company may
inspect the discount book within proper
hours: Cockburn v. Union Bank, 13 La.
Ann. 289. Part of the directors of a
bank cannot exclude one of their number
from the privilege of examining the
discount book to which all the rest
have access, on the ground that he is
hostile to the institution and will use
the information he may obtain to its
injury: Hatch v. City Bank of New
Orleans, I Rob. (La.) 470. A corporator of a municipal corporation has a
right to have a general inspection, and
to take copies of the public documents
and records of the corporation, under
such rules and restrictions as will preserve them from loss or mutilation, and
prevent any serious interruption of the
duties of the custodian. The right is
not to be restricted to cases where the

COIMOMWEALTH v. PHCENIX IRON CO.
corporator has some private interest for
the enforcement and protection of which
an inspection of certain documents is
necessary: People v. Cornell, 47 Barb.
329. But a corporator must have distinct and certain grounds for inspection.
These he must aver upon his knowledge
and not upon information and belief,
and he must disclose the sources of his
knowledge: Central Crosstown Railway
Co. v. Twenty-Third St. Railway Co., 53
How. Pr. 45.
In a very recent case in Colorado,
Bean v. People, ex rel., published in
the Chicago Legal News of March 8th
1884, it was held that section 667 of the
General Statutes, which requires the
county clerk to keep his" office "open
**
*
during the usual business hours
and that (all) books required to be in
his office shall be open for the examination of any person," does not require the
clerk to permit any person so desiring, to
use the books for the purpose of making
and keeping up a complete set of abstract
books for private speculation. As to
the necessary averments in an action
for refusing inspection of a stock-book,
see Williams v. College, 4-c., Road Co.,
45 Ind. 170.
As regards the rights of strangers to
inspect the books of a corporation, it
would seem that there should be a distinction between corporations of a purely
private character, and those exercising
public or quasi public functions. Says
Mr. Grant (Corporations, p. 311), "It
must be observed that entries in the
books of public corporations, that is to
say, bodies incorporated to serve some
public purpose and not merely companies
of traders incorporated for their own
purposes'of pecuniary emolument, may
be inspected for the purpose of evidence
by parties sufficiently interested in them,
provided the entries relate to public
matters and not merely to the private
interests of the corporation and the party,
and provided the evidence is required in
a civil action. It is usual to grant in-

spection in civil actions where franchises
are contested, and in other cases where
the corporation can be regarded as a
depository of a trust for the public, and
the party applying being directly interested in the entries or other documents
which lie seeks to inspect, and tte matters contained in them having direct
reference to the question at issue in the
cause. * * * Corporators have always,
on showing a good reason, though not
for curiosity's sake, a right of access to,
and inspection of, all books, muniments,
and papers belonging to the corporation."
And lie cites, as to what are sufficient
reasons for the application: Gas Co. v.
Clarke, 7 Bing. 95 ; 4 B. & C. 899; R.
v. Merchant Tailors' Co., 2 B. & Ad.
115. What a sufficient demand: Ex
parte Hutt, 7 Dowl. 690. What a sufficient refusal: R. v. Wilts, 4'c., Canal
Co., 3 A. & E. 477. He further adds,
"it has been said that inspection can
only be granted to a member of the corporation and not to a stranger to the
corporation: Phil. Ev,811 ; 2 Ves. 620;
ride, Burrall v. Nicholson, I My. & K.
680; but it will be found that the
law is as stated above, and that the rule
to inspect entries in corporation books,
papers, and muniments, will be granted
to a foreigner (or person not a member
of the corporation), provided he is
directly interested in the subject-matter
of the inspection and the entry is of a
public nature, and it has immediate
reference to the question at issue in the
cause." See, further, 1 Greenleaf on
Evidence, J 474-478.
Remedy.-Mandamus is a common
remedy in case of the refusal of the corporation to allow an inspection of its
books, &c.: Rex v. Bank of England,
2 B. & Ald. 620 ; Rex v. Wilts Canal
Co., 3 A. & E. 477. In the latter
case, a stockholder in a canal company
applied to the clerk of the company for
an inspection of its books, which were
in the clerk's charge. The clerk said
he would refer the demand to a certain
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committee. The stockholder attended
the committee and there repeated his
request; and the chairman said they
would take time to consider it. Ten
days afterwards he applied again to the
clerk, who refused the inspection. Held,
that there had been no sufficient refusal
by the committee to warrant a mandamus. Semble, that a party applying for
a mandamus to give inspection of such
documents, ought to show that when be
demanded the inspection, he stated the
object for which he wanted it. In
People v. Throop, 12 Wend. 183, the
cashier of a bank had refused to permit
a director to inspect the discount book.
Held, that mandamus would lie, directed
to the cashier, although his conduct had
been approved by a resolution of the
board. A stockholder may have a writ
of mandamus to permit the inspection
of the discount book within proper
hours: Cockburn v. Union Bank, 13 La.
Ann. 289. See, also, Hatch v. City
Bank of New Orleans, I Rob. (La.)
470. In Queen v. Derbyshire, 6-c., Ry.
Co., 3 El. & BI. 784, it was held that
under section 36 of the Companies'
Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, a party
who had recovered judgment against a
corporation was not precluded from
issuing execution against the shareholders who had not paid for their
shares, though lands of the company
have been delivered in clegit, if the
proceeds of the lands be insufficient to
satisfy the debt. And that, therefore,
a mandamus should issue commanding
the company to give the creditor inspection of the register of shareholders.
But where a corporator demanded of the
secretary of the corporation an inspection of its books, and the demand was
not shown to have been made at the
office of the company, and no excuse
was made for not making it there, the
court refused to grant a mandamus:
People v. Walker, 9 Mich. 328. The
court will not grant an application
by members of a corporate body for a

mandamus to inspect the documents of
the corporation, unless it be shown that
such inspection is necessary, with reference to some specific dispute or question
depending in which the parties applying
are interested ; and the inspection will
then only be granted to such extent as
may be necessary for the particular
occasion : King v. M3erchant Tailors' Co.,
2 B. & Ad. 115. Mandamus will not
be granted members of a corporation
allowing inspection of corporate books
upon mere belief that the company's
affairs are improperly conducted : King
v. .3ferchant Tailors' Co., supra. See,
also, Pratt v. M. Cutlery Co., 35 Conn.
36.
Productionand inspection for purposes
of evidence.-The law as to the production and inspection of corporate books as
evidence does not appear to he well settled. Said WALLACE, J., in Wertheim
v. ContinentalRy. &-Trust Co., 15 Fed.
Rep. 716, "No authority is found in any
decisions of the Federal courts denying
the right to compel corporations to produce evidence which may be necessary
and vital to the rights of the litigants.
On principle, it is impossible to suggest
any reason why a corporation should
be privileged to withhold evidence which
an individual would be required to produce. It may be inconvenient, and
sometimes embarrassing, to the managers of a corporation to require its books
and papers to be taken from its office
and exhibited to third persons, but it is
also inconvenient and often onerous to
individuals to require them to do the
same thing. Considerations of inconvenience must give way to the paramount right of litigants to resort to evidence which it may be in the power of
witnesses to produce, and without which
grave interests might be jeoparded and
the administration of justice thwarted."
A distinction appears to have been taken
in cases where the corporation was a
party, and those cases where it was a
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stranger to the action. In Wertheim ,subsequently held in several cases that a
v. ContinentalRy. &"Trust Co., supra, the corporation could not be compelled to
question raised was whether the presi- produce its books whether a party or
dent and secretary of a construction not: La Farge v. La Farge Ins. Co.,
company, a corporation, could be com- 14 How. Pr. 26 ; Morgan v. Morgan, 16
pelled by a subpoena duces tecum to pro- Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 291. In the latter
duce books and papers of the corpora- case the court said: "Where a corporation in a suit in equity to which the cor- tion is not a party to the action, no
poration was not a party. The court pomvcr of enforcing an examination or
said: "The proceeding is opposed on tileproduction of its books and papers is
authority of several cases in the state afforded on a trial between other parcourts of New York.' The first of the ties ; nor can its agents or officers, in
their individual capacities, be compelled
cases is, The President, &c., of Bank of
Utica v. Hillard, 5 Cow. 153, where a to produce the books of the corporation
clerk of the bank refused to produce the over which they have not absolute control." And he added: "Even in a
books: SAVAGE, C. J., said : 'The
obligation of the witness to produce the case of an action in which a corporation
books upon the duces tecurn depends upon is a party, the production of its books
the question whether they were in his cannot be enforced by subpcena duces
possession or under his control;' and the tecum served on its officers; that can
obligation was denied because he was only be effected by way of discovery
a mere clerk of the corporation. The under the provisions of the revised statsame case was before the court again utes." In several states, statutes have
(5 Cow. 419) upon a motion to attach been enacted compelling the production
the cashier of the bank who had ref'sed of documents in the possession of parties
by subpoena duces tecnm, or by order of
to produce the books under subpoena.
The motion was denied because the bank court. Section 868 of the Now York
could not be required to produce evi- Code of Procedure provides that "the
dence against itself as a party to the production upon a trial, of a book or
action. Both of these cases, by the paper, belonging to or under the control
strongest implication, concede the power of a corporation, may be compelled, in
to compel the production of the books like manner, as if it was in the hands or
by an officer where the corporation is not under the control of a natural person.
a party." In Crowther v. Appleby, L. For that purpose a subpcena duces tecum
L., 9 C. P. 27, the court refused to or an order made as prescribed in the
grant an attachment against a secretary last section, as the case requires, must
and solicitor of a railway company, on be directed to the president or other
the ground that he was nothing more head of the corporation, or to the officer
than the servant of the directors, and thereof in whose custody the book or
as such had no authority to produce the paper is." This statute was held to
books. But in Atty-General v. Wilson, apply to foreign corporations keeping
9 Sim. 526, Vice-Chancellor SHADWELL books within the state: Re Sykes, 10
distinctly laid down that a partner in a Ben. 162. But it does not authorize
bank could not be compelled to produce an order in the nature of a subpoena
under a subjna duces tecum the books decum tecum to the directors of a defendand accounts of the firm in a suit in
ant corporation ; they are not "parties :"
which they were not parties, where his Boorman v. Atlantic, 4-c., Ry. Co., 17
copartners refused to consent to his Hun 555. In New Jersey, a party to a
doing so. Nevertheless, upon the au- suit may be compelled by a subpcena
thority of the cases in 5 Cowen, it was duces tecum to produce papers and docu-
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ments to be used on the trial as evidence: Murray v. Elston, 23 N. J. Eq.
212.
A subpcna duces tecum cannot issue
to the surveyor-general or other public
officer to bring original papers into
court, whereof certified copies would be
evidence: Delaney v. Regulators, 1
Yeates 403; U. S. v. Tilden, 18 Alb.
L. J. 416, a case in which a corporation
formed under the laws of Illinois had
its general office in Chicago, where its
president resided. It had a branch
office in New York for the transaction
of business there, which was in charge
of the vice-president, who was also
secretary. There was an assistant secretary in Chicago, who was a co-ordinate
officer with the secretary and not under
his control. By a rule of the company,
books of stock transfers, &c., which
were kept in New York in charge of
the secretary, when no longer in use
were sent to the general office of the
company at Chicago, and were in charge
of the officers there. Held, that after
such books were sent by the secretary
in New York to Chicago, they were no
longer in the custody of that officer ; lie
could not be required to produce them
by subpoena duces tecum under section
868 of the New York Code.
The difficulty and conflict of authority
seem to lie, not so much in the right as
in the remedy. The right as to the
inspection and production of corporate
books, with some restrictions, seems
reasonably clear, but it is by no means
so clear that their production can be required by subpona duces tecum. The
books are in the possession of the corporation. It, and not its clerks, owns
and controls them. But a subpcena
duces tecum will not reach the corporation. It is an artificial person; an
intangible legal entity beyond the reach
of a subpoena.
Where it is sought by subpoena to
compel corporate agents and officers to
produce its books, it is clear that some

distinction must be drawn.
Every
clerk and bookkeeper of a corporation
ought not to be compelled by subpoena
to come into court with such of its books
and papers as he may happen to have in
his possession. A distinction should be
made between the mere clerical laborers
of a company and its officers and managers. The latter are the persons who,
having charge of corporate books,
should be compelled by subpoena to produce them in court. Telegraph companies have made strenuous but unsuccessful opposition to the production of
telegrams in suits to which they were
not parties. See UnitedStates v. Hunter,
15 Fed. Rep. 712, as to what is sufficient description of telegrams by district
attorney when applying for subptena,
and as to the duty of an agent of a telegraph company who is subpoenaed. See,
also, United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill.
566. A call in a subpmna duces tecun
for certain telegraghic messages between
certain parties, naming them, sent'or
received by any or all of said parties
within a certaiti time, is not a sufficient
description; Ex parte Brown, 72 Mlo.
83. A statute prohibiting telegraph
operators or agents from disclosing
telegraphic communications, does not
apply in cases where such operators
or agents are subpoenaed with a duces
tecum for dispatches: .Henislerv. Freedman, 2 Pars. Select Cases 274. As
to the duty of witnesses under a subpoena duces tecum, see Wertheim v. Cont.
P.., &c., Trust Co., 15 Fed. R.
716, note; Trotter v. Latson, 7 How. Pr.
261 ; Shippen v. Wells, 2 Yeates 260;
Bonesteel v. Lynde, 8 How. Pr. 352 ;
People v. Dyckman, 24 How. Pr. 222;
.Mitchel's (ase, 12 Abb. Pr. 249 ; Jarvis v. Clerk, 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 129 ;
Corsen v. Dubois, I Holt 239 ; Doe v.
Kelly, 4 Dowl. 273; Doe v. Cliffiord, 2
C. K. 448 ; Hall v. Young, 37 N. H.
134; Burnham v. Morrisey, 14 Gray
240; Lane v. Cole. 12 Barb. 680; Carlton v. Litton, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 1; Clyde
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v. Rogers, 24 Hun 145, 87 N. Y. 6! ?5.
As to when a public officer is not requilred
to produce books under subpcena, see
Corbett v. Gibson, 16 Blatchf. 334; PReg.
v. Russell, 7 Dowl. 693 ; Gray v. Pc ntland.
Orderfor inspection.-As to an orcler
,
of court for inspection, Mr. Greenle af
in his work on Evidence, says: "I 'he
extent of this power and the nature of
the order, whether it should be perem ptory or in the shape of a rule to enlarrge
the time to plead unless the writing is
produced, does not seem to be vc ry
clearly agreed." As to when it %,ill
not be granted, see Powell v. Bradbui.y,
4 M., G. & S. 541 ; 13 Jur. 349.
In Ju.stice v. Bank, 83 N. C. 8, a
motion by the plaintiff (a~depositor) I,or
an order compelling the defendant ba nk
to permit an.inspection of its books w,as
allowed. The court held that such inspection would be allowed where it is
made to appear that the party applyi ng
for the order cannot obtain the inforn iation sought otherwise than by such inspection. An order for iispection befibre
a referee, of books of a corporation ii2 a
distant state, should merely direct a
delivery of sworn copies withit, a reas mable time: Ervin v. Oregon By. 4- N zv.
Co., 22 Hun 566. See, also, Bas v.
Steele, 3 Wash. 381 ; Bank of U. S. v.
Hilson, 3 Cr. C. C. 213; Tuttle v.
M[echanics' Bank, 6 Whart. (Pa.) 21 6 ;
Pumphrey v. Coleman, I Blackf. (In( 1.)
199; Rose v. King, 5 S. & R. (Pi
241 ; Arrott v. Pratt, 2 Whart. (Pi a)
566; Gilpin v. Howell, 5 Penn. St.
41 ; Wlillis v. Bayley, 19 Johns. 2138.
The Pennsylvania statute, allowing inspection, does not apply in an action for
slander: Morgan v. atson, 2 WhfLrt.
(Pa.) 10. See, also, ield v. Zemansky,
9 111. App. 479 ; UnitedStatesv. Hut ,on,
10 Ben. 268; Phelps v. Ad. 4- Pacific
Tel. Co., 46 Wis. 266 ; People V. Vewaygo Co. Circuit Judge, 41 Minn. 258.
By the Act of September 24th 1789
(I U. S. at Large 82), it is providedt hat

the courts of the United States "shall
have power in all actions at-law, on
motion and due notice thereof being
given, to require the parties to produce
books or writings in their possession or
power, which contain evidence pertinent
to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they might be compelled
to produce the same by the ordinary
rules of proceeding in chancery." See
United States v. Youngs, 10 Ben. 264,
as to the production of official weigher's
returns.
In England, the Statute 14 and 15
Vict. c. 99, 6, provides that whenever
any action or other legal proceeding
shall thereafter be pending in certain
common-law courts, naming them, such
court, and each of the judges thereof,
might respectively, on application made
for such purpose by either of the litigants,
compel the opposite party to allow the
party making the application to inspect
all documents in the custody or under
the control of such party, relating to
such action or other legal proceeding.
Common-faw courts may order inspection
of the documents, whenever a court of
equity would grant discovery. Very
similar statutes have been enacted in
many of the states, and their application
to proceedings in chancery is to be determined by the construction of each
particular statute.
In reference to the right of the public
to the inspection of corporate records of
transactions affecting the public, there
is certainly need of legislation. Hundreds of corporations are charged with
public duties. They are engaged in serving the public in many ways. The only
records of such service are contained in
their books and papers; yet it is stoutly
maintained that these records relate to
purely private business of the companies.
Even Congress is denied access to these
records and is defied to compel such access. Witness the absolute refusal of the
W~stern Union Telegraph Company to
exhibit to a committee of the United
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States Senate, its contracts for press
telegraphic service. What is the use
of laws prohibiting discriminations and
extortions, if the contracts and record
which show such discriminations and

extortions may be kept secret? How
can these offences be discovered? How
can they be punished ?
CwARL s L. BILLINGS.
Chicago.

United States Oircuit Court, -Districtof Rhode I8land.
MATHEWSON v. PH(ENIX IRON FOUNDRY.
At common law, persons of suitable age might, by words of present consent,
contract a valid marriage without the presence and intervention of a minister, and
without any particular form of solemnization.
A statute may take away this common-law right, but this is not to be presumed.
When the statute regulating marriage is directory merely and does not expressly
forbid other marriage contracts, a common-law marriage is valid and entitles the
wife to dower on the death of the husband.
Although the early statutes of a state abrogated entirely the common law by
making marriages illegal unless conformed to statutory regulations, yet on the
repeal of such statutes and the passage of a statute directory merely, the common
law is revived.
In this country, where there is no established church and no ecclesiastical court,
the common-law marriage is complete and not partial.
If a written contract entered itito between the parties in the presence of witnesses, constitutes a valid marriage per verba de prwsenti, neither the fact that the
previous relations of the parties had been unlawful, nor the fact that either party
afterwards denied the marriage would destroy the effect of the contract.

BILL in equity to establish the right of -complainant to dower in
lands occupied by respondepts under title derived from complain-

ant's deceased husband. The answer denied the marriage.
case was heard on bill, answer and proofs.

The

B. -. Buztler, -E. H. Johnson and E. S. Hopkins, counsel for
complainant.
Brown & 'an

Slyc/k and James T'llinghast, for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLT, J.-In
this suit the complainant claims dower in certain
land, as the widow of Henry C. Mathewson, through whom the

defendant derived title.
the following paper:
Vor. XXXIf.-51

As evidence of marriage, she produces
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"PROVIDENCE, R. I., August 18th 1859.
This is to certify that we, H. C. Mathewson and Sarah D.
Mathewson, both of Providence, R. I., do hereby acknowledge ourselves before the following witnesses to be man and wife.
H. C. MATHEWSON,
SARAH D. MATHEWSON.

Signed in the presence of:
C. A. CARPENTER,
S. J. HORTON."

The witness Horton was a clergyman, then residing in Connecticut. Another person, named Connell, swears he was also present
when the paper was signed. The defendant denies the legality of
the marriage.
The statutes of Rhode Island, in force at this time, contain certain provisions regulating the subject of marriage: Rev. Stat.
1857, ch. 134.
By section seven, any minister or elder domiciled in the state,
or either justice of the Supreme Court, may join persons in
marriage.
Section nine prohibits any minister, elder or magistrate from
joining in marriage any persons unless they shall sign and deliver
to such minister, elder or magistrate a certificate setting forth their
names, age, color, occupation, &c.
By section eleven a penalty is imposed upon the minister, elder
or magistrate who shall join persons in marriage without first
receiving such certificate.
By section fourteen the solemnization of marriage is required to
be in the presence of two witnesses, at least, besides the minister,
, elder or magistrate officiating.
Section fifteen permits Quakers, Friends and Jews to marry
according to their forms and ceremonies.
Section sixteen requires the parties to any marriage, before celebration, to deliver to the town clerk the certificate mentioned in
section nine, under penalty of fine or imprisonment.
It is clear that the complainant was not married in the mode
laid down by statute. The minister present was not domiciled in
the state. It does not appear that he officiated at the marriage.
He only testifies that he signed the paper, and that those whose
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signatures appear, signed it. The parties gave no certificate, as
required by statute.
But while this marriage was not according to the form of the
statute, it was a good contract of marriage, per verba de prcesenti,
or at common law, so called.
Marriage has long since been regarded as a civil contract, the
essence of which is consent.

Nuptias non concubitus, 8ed con.

se8fusfacit. This, says Chancellor KENT, is the language equally
of the commoin and canon law, and of common reason: 2 Kent
Com. 51.
At common law, as held in this country, and until recently, it
would seem as generally understood in England, persons of suitable
age might, by words of present consent, contract a valid marriage
without the presence and intervention of a minister, and without
any particular form of solemnization. A statute may, of course,
take away this common-law right, but this is not to be presumed.
The right is not conferred by statute, but exists independent of it,
and, therefore, it is held the rule does not apply, that when a statute
directs a thing to be done in a particular way, it is void if done in
any other way. The construction usually adopted is, that when
the statute regulating marriage is directory merely, when it does
not expressly forbid other marriage contracts, a marriage per verba
de prawsenti, or at common law, is good.
It will be observed that the Rhode Island statute is directory in
form. It contains no words making marriage a nullity unless the
statutory form is complied with. It nowhere declares that marriages good at common law shall be void. On the contrary, section
thirteen says: "Whoever shall be married without duly proceeding as by this chapter is required, shall be fined not exceeding
fifty dollars," which implies that marriage may be contracted independent of the statutory form, and that such marriage is not
invalid, but that the parties so married shall be liable to a penalty.
This provision is in marked contrast with the earlier sections of
the chapter, where the statute expressly makes marriages within
the prohibited degrees of affinity or consanguinity, and in some
other cases, absolutely null and void.
We think a careful reading of the whole statute impresses the
mind with the conviction that while the legislature intended to
subject to punishment the parties, as well as those officiating, who
might fail to observe the statutory provisions, it was not the inten-
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tion to make marriages void by reason of non-compliance, and
thus subject parties to all the serious consequences which would
flow from such a result.
Undoubtedly the legislature could prohibit the exercise of the
right of marriage except in the way prescribed by statute. But
the'question here is, what is the proper rule of interpretation under
a; statute like that of Rhode Island ?
Judge STRONG, in construing a statute of similar character, and
speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, says : "No
doubt a statute may take away a common-law right; but there is
always a presumption that the legislature has no such intention
unless it be plainly expressed. A statute may declare that no marriages shall be valid unless they are solemnized in a prescribed
manner; but such an enactment is a very different thing from a
law requiring all marriages to be entered into in the presence of a
magistrate or a clergyman, or that it be preceded by a license or
publication of banns, or be attested by witnesses. Such formal provisions may be construed as merely directory, instead of being
treated as destructive of a common-law right to form the marriage
relation by words of present assent. And such we think has been
the rule generally adopted in construing statutes regulating marriage. Whatever directions they may give respecting its formation or solemnization, courts have usually held a marriage good at
common law to be good notwithstanding the statutes, unless they
contain express words of nullity :" Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S.76,
79. And see the remarks of GRIER, J., in Hallett v. Collins, 10
How. 174, 181. The weight of authority seems largely to sustain
this view: 1 Bishop. Mar. & Div., § 283; 2 Greenl. Ev., § 460;
2 Kent Com. 51 ; Reeve's Dom. Rel. 307 ; Hutchins v. Kimmell,
31 Mich. 126, 130; Pearson v. ifowey, 6 Halst. 12; Hantz v.
Sealey, 6 Binn. 405; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Penn. St. 132;
.Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52; Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47;
Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige 574; Starr v. Peck, 1 Hill 270; Clayton
v. Wardell, 4 Comst. 230; Oheney v. Arnold, 15 N. Y. 345;
O' ara v.JEisenlohr, 38 Id. 296; -Duncan v. Duncan, 10 Ohio
St. 181 ; Carmichael v. State, 12 Id. 553 ; Graham v. Bennet,
2 Cal. 503; Estate of McCausland, 52 Id. 568; .Dumareslyv.
Fishly, 3 A. K. Marsh. 368; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 8 B. Mon.
113; Londonderry v. Chester, 2 N. H. 268; 1ewbury v. Brunsw'ck, 2 Vt. 151. But see Northfield v. Plymouth, 20 Id. 582;
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State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765; Potier v. Barclay, 15 Id. 439;
Yates v. Houston, 3 Texas 433; Patton v. Philadelphia, 1 La.
Ann. 98; Holmes v. Holmes, 6 Id. 463; Cargile v. Wood, 63 Mo.
501; Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Id. 391. In a few states it must be
admitted the rule is different: Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48;
Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Id. 459; Denison v. Denison,
35 Md. 361; Cram v. Burnham, 5 Greenl. 213; Ligonia v.
Buxton, 2 Id. 102; State v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & Bat. 177, 180;
Bashaw v. State, 1 Yerg. 177; Grisham v. State, Id. 589; Dunbarton v. Franklin, 19 N. H. 257.
But it is said that common-law marriages were never considered
valid in Rhode Island. The question has not been passed upon
by the State Court. The argument is based upon the history of
legislation upon the subject, and especially upon the older statutes.
The earliest statute relating to marriage was passed at the first
session of the General Assembly ever held in Rhode Island in
1647, and it provided that no other marriages should be held
lawful except those contracted according to the form of the statute.
The act declares: "No contract or agreement between a man and
a woman to own each other as man and wife shall be owned from
henceforth throughout the whole colony as a lawful marriage, nor

the children or issue so coming together to be legitimate or lawfully begotten, but such as are in the first place with the parents,
then orderly published in two several meetings of the townsmen,
and lastly confirmed before the bead officer of the town, and
entered into the town clerk's book." Then follows a penalty
against those going contrary to the "present ordinance :" 1 Col.
Rec. 187.
By Act of March 17th 1656, parties were required to publish
their intention of marriage, and objection to such marriage might
be heard before two magistrates, when, if disallowed, it was referred
to the "General Court of Tryalls :" 1 Col. Rec. 330.
The Act of May 3d 1665, after condemning the loose observance
of the Statute of 1647, orders that act and subsequent acts to be
punctually observed, and inflicts an additional penalty of fornication on persons who should presume to marry otherwise or live
together as man and wife. The act then proceeds expressly to
validate the relations of all such then living within the colony,
"that are reputed to live together as man and wife by the common
observation or account of their neighborhood :" 2 Col. Rec. 104.
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By the Act of 1701, it was ordered that all marriages take place
after due publication of intentions, etc,, and a fine was imposed on
officers presuming to join persons in marriage without such publication, excepting those married, according to the laws, customs and
ceremonies of the Church of England, and Quakers. The exception was afterwards extended to Jews. This act was entitled, "An
Act for preventing Clandestine Marriages," and this same title we
find in the several subsequent revisions of the statutes until the
revision of 1857: 3 Col. Rec. 435; Pub. Laws 1663-1745, p. 30;
Digest of 1767, pp. 172-175.
By Act of December 1733, settled ministers and elders of every
denomination were authorized to join persons in marriage after due
publication, and upon receiving certificate. They were required to
keep and return to the town clerk a record thereof for registry,
and a fine was imposed upon them for marrying without publication: 4 Col. Rec. 4, 490; Pub. Laws 1663-1745, p. 176.
It is claimed that these enactments are controlling, and that they
show that common-law marriages were never recognised in Rhode
Island. The common law has always existed in Rhode Island,
except so far as modified or changed by statute. This is true
of marriage, as well as other subjects.
The legislature may have seen fit in early times, to do away
entirely with the common law, and to make marriage illegal unless
it conformed to the statutory regulations. But if the legislature
had at any time repealed all statutes on the subject, the common
law would have been revived. And in so far as the legislature has
seen fit to change the statute, to make it less restrictive by not
declaring all other marriages illegal, as in the earliest enactments
in so far it has restored the common-law right. If upon a proper
construction of the statute in force, we find the common-law right
is not denied, then it still exists, though it may not have existed
under former and different statutes. Unless the statute under consideration, upon a proper construction, prohibits marriages perverba
de prcesenti, we do not think we should by implication derived
from old statutes decide against their validity. To make marriages
void and children illegitimate, by implication, is a serious thing.
Because under earlier statutes a marriage not made in conformity
therewith may have been invalid we do not feel warranted in
implying that such is the proper interpretation of the statute of
1857. We think it safer to hold that in modifying the terms of the
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statute the legislature intended to modify the law, and as we have
before said, our conclusion is that the statute of 1857 does not
make a marriage per verba de praesenti, or at common law void,
this being the construction put upon similar statutes in most of the
states, and in the Supreme Court of the United States.
But it is contended that marriage per verba de prcsenti was
not a full marriage at common law, that it was only a partial
marriage, where either party could compel the other to go before
the ecclesiastical court and complete the contract in facie ecclesice.
Whatever view may now be taken in England since the case of
The Queen v. Millis, decided in 1844 (10 Cl. & F. 534), where
the House of Lords, upon appeal, were evenly divided on the
question, the adjudications in this country from the earliest times
have established the full validity of marriages at common law.
This is the view taken by the Supreme Court in feister v. Moore,
and by Chancellor Kent, Judge Reeve, Professor Greenleaf,
Judge Cooley and Mr. Bishop. (See authorities before cited.)
Partial marriages have never been recognised in this country. We
have no Established Church, and no Ecclesiastical Court to which
application can be made to complete the contract. Our situation
and circumstances would necessarily bring about a modification of
the common law as recently expounded by English courts. The
proposition that the presence and intervention of a person "in holy
orders" is requisite to a valid marriage at common law in this
country is contrary to the opinion of our ablest jurists and to a long
line of adjudications. It would indeed have seemed strange to our
Puritan forefathers if in order to contract a legal marriage, they
had been obliged to bring with them a clergyman of the Church of
England or of Rome to be present at the ceremony: Bishop Mar.
& Div., § 282.
If marriage at common law in this country by words of present
consent is valid and complete, then clearly the widow should be
entitled to dower: Scribner on Dower, says (vol. i. p. 107),
"Under our system of laws it is a solecism in language to speak
of a marriage as good for some purposes and not good for all-as a
marriage which is not a marriage. And it may be safely said that
in those states where the courts already have, or hereafter shall
determine, in favor of the validity of private marriages, such marriages will be regarded as being attended with all the civil rights
and obligations which, under the ecclesiastical law, flow from a

